After several years of unofficial and official preparations, the Moroccan defense industrial and technological base (BITD) is consolidating its foundations. The proof lies in the increase in the budget allocated to the purchase of weapons and equipment, as well as to the defense industry, in the 2026 Finance Law: 24% more, for a total package of 73 billion dirhams. In parallel, the budget line mobilized to support the modernization of the Royal Armed Forces’ (FAR) capabilities will increase by 17.8% to 157 billion dirhams.
An effort that Abdellatif Loudiyi, Minister Delegate to the Head of Government in charge of the Administration of National Defense (ADN), highlighted during the presentation of his 2026 budget to the Parliamentary Committee: “Since the launch of this strategic initiative, 10 industrial projects dedicated to defense activities have been authorized, totaling 260 million dollars in investments.”
After the opening of the Moroccan production site of Tata Defense, the Lockheed Martin maintenance center for F-16s and Hercules C-130s, as well as the announcement of a production unit for the Turkish Baykar, not to mention the network of subcontractors and operators already working with the maintenance units of the various branches of the FAR, it is undeniable that the foundations of the BITD have been laid.
With this modernization effort of its defense system, ranging from equipment and weapons for the FAR to the establishment of a BITD, Morocco is simply responding to the security imperatives imposed by global geopolitics, as well as those of its regional sphere and influence. And the multiplication of armed conflicts over the past fifteen years should not be seen only as a threat. These wars make it possible to learn and adjust the orientations as well as the production doctrine of our BITD.
Retain the lessons from Ukraine
If Morocco must observe and analyze a conflict in order to draw “battle tested” lessons from it, it is indeed the one opposing Ukraine and Russia. The war currently tearing apart eastern Ukraine is particularly interesting for FAR strategists, but also for those leading the BITD. After the Russian invasion in February 2022, the nature of the clashes quickly changed. It all began with a war of movement, strongly inspired by the operational art of the Red Army, with high concentrations of mechanized columns. However, their length, combined with logistical problems, made them easy targets for a Ukrainian army that, after a few hours of shock, activated a flexible defense mode, fixing the heads of the Russian columns, which allowed mobile units to harass their rear.
This first phase continued with the Ukrainian counteroffensive of August 2022, which lasted until November of the same year. Kiev also favored a war of movement—this time with Western inspiration—by breaking through the front line, which opened the way to rapid incursions of mechanized columns. These could then begin encirclement maneuvers against Russian forces. Taking advantage of the momentum created by the failure of the Russian push on its capital, the Ukrainian army managed to provoke the retreat of the Red Army, which had to abandon the west bank of the Dnieper.
From the end of 2022, the beginning of the second phase of the war emerged, with the battle of Bakhmut (taken by the Russians in the spring of 2023): the front line stabilized and the city concentrated the efforts of both belligerents. This was followed by a new counteroffensive in the summer of 2023, a Russian offensive in May 2024, then a Ukrainian push on Russian territory (Kursk region) in August 2024. But the saturation of the operational field by drones ended up freezing the positions of both sides, in a modern form of trench warfare.
The failure of the latest Ukrainian counteroffensive was followed by a generalized offensive by the Russian army on the entire front line, which is still ongoing. This new phase results from the change in doctrine of Russian tacticians and strategists who are adopting a new approach more suited to the reality on the ground. Gone are mechanized offensives on targeted points, as these are largely neutralized as soon as they are detected; the Russian army opts for incremental advances, using small units tasked with attacking Ukrainian trenches and infiltrating deep behind them. All of it supported by various types of drones, targeted artillery fire, and glide bombs. And the results can be seen on the ground, with the difficult situation in Pokrovsk, a former fortified city and logistical base of the Ukrainian army in the Donetsk region.
This new way of waging war is the result of a reorganization of the Russian high command after the failures mentioned above, but above all of an improvement in the integration of new technologies within the defense industry. “Military innovations in the use of Shahed drones, FPV drones, and unmanned aerial vehicles (C-UAV), while also using lightweight electronic warfare systems, illustrate Russia’s ability to institutionalize innovation within its doctrine, force structures, and military-industrial complex,” explains Colonel Vytis Andreika of the Lithuanian Armed Forces, in an article published last October by the US Army journal.
The Lithuanian colonel also notes that the Russian army has managed “to adapt its conduct based on the lessons of the war in Ukraine, challenging earlier assumptions about its rigidity.” Adnane Kaab, a consultant in geopolitics, foresight, and international security and former officer of the Royal Air Forces (FRA), says the same thing. He believes that “the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East have reminded us of a reality often overlooked in peacetime. Operational superiority no longer relies solely on technology, but on rapid adaptability, industrial resilience, and the speed of integrating feedback.”
Enter into “war mode”
This observation is also shared by a former officer of the French army, met by TelQuel on the sidelines of the Defsec forum held on November 11 in Rabat. For him, if there is one lesson to be learned from what is currently happening in Ukraine, it is the obligation to abandon the defense industrial production modes “of peacetime.” And he cites the Europeans, who cannot support the Ukrainian war effort, despite numerous political declarations of intent. Formerly in charge of liaison between the French army and its BITD, our source gives as an example Russia, but also its Chinese, Iranian, and North Korean partners, whose BITDs have adopted a wartime production pace.
A change in industrial doctrine that is being felt on the ground, as the tactical advantage offered to the Russians by fiber-optic drones, of which tens of thousands are deployed every day, is made possible by the adaptation of Russian manufacturers, who are able to maintain significant production volumes. But also, in this case, by their Chinese subcontractors (not affected by Western sanctions). This is evidenced by the 527,000 km of fiber optic cable exported by China to Russia last August. Shipments even tripled between June and August 2025. The Chinese industry also supplies lithium batteries, whose exports reached a value of 47 million dollars last June. These components are absorbed by the roughly 140 drone manufacturers and 60 spare parts suppliers registered in Russia since 2023.
“It is clear that Russia is adapting its tactics and technology based on the lessons learned in Ukraine, institutionalizing changes within its doctrine, its structures, and its military-industrial complex. This continuous process highlights the dynamic nature of modern warfare and the need for ongoing progress to maintain a strategic advantage,” emphasizes the Lithuanian colonel in his article. He also highlights the Voentekh project, announced by the Russian Ministry of Defense last February, which aims to accelerate the implementation of technological innovations by testing new products on the battlefield and introducing them into the army’s equipment.
Morocco must therefore draw lessons from the war in Ukraine, as long as the kingdom is in the consolidation phase of its BITD and can easily calibrate its production tool by taking into account the imperatives of a high-intensity war. Adnane Kaab believes that Morocco can draw three lessons from the war in Ukraine or from the Israeli-Iranian confrontation. Starting with the importance of industrial agility. “In Ukraine, the proximity between the front, the workshops, and the decision-making chain created an accelerated innovation cycle. A high-performance BITD is first of all an ecosystem capable of absorbing field feedback and producing quickly,” explains the former FRA colonel.
The second lesson? Directing production toward equipment gives the army reinforced capacities in saturation and asymmetry on the battlefield. “The Iran–Israel duel demonstrated the strategic effectiveness of low-cost systems, produced in mass, capable of bypassing very advanced defense architectures,” recalls Kaab. Finally, the Moroccan BITD must integrate resilience capabilities, in order to ensure production even under constraint. “Russia, despite the sanctions, has reorganized its supply chains and simplified its processes. The message is clear: strategic autonomy is not only an ambition, but an ability to maintain the effort in a degraded environment,” explains the consultant. This resilience, for him, requires autonomy in strategic consumables: “The success of a prolonged operation depends above all on the availability of ammunition, guided weapons, and critical spare parts. Developing this base is a multiplier of sovereignty.”
“Morocco is not destined to reproduce the industrial trajectories of major powers. It can, however, anticipate them, bypass them, and accelerate them”
By examining the announcements of defense manufacturers setting up operations within the national BITD, one notices a significant share of drone manufacturers (Turkish and Israeli). This demonstrates that the Administration of National Defense and the FAR General Staff are taking into account the importance of these systems. Investing early in this technology also shows that lessons are being learned from the mistakes of countries that chose to invest in financially heavy drones, such as the American Reapers or Sea Guardians. The same goes for the Europeans, who adopted heavy and budget-consuming industrial models without having the means for massive, low-cost production like China, Russia, Iran, Turkey, or Israel.
“Morocco is not destined to reproduce the industrial trajectories of major powers. It can, however, anticipate them, bypass them, and accelerate them,” confirms Adnane Kaab, for whom setting up a drone and anti-drone ecosystem is an imperative: “It is today the center of gravity of modern conflicts. It is also the area that offers the greatest potential for ‘leapfrogging’ to rapidly reduce capability gaps.”
Strategic window
Setting up a BITD capable of operating “in war mode,” in a context of relative peace, requires the establishment of bridges between civilian and military industries. Bridges capable of functioning in both directions. Adopting a “dual-use” logic should also make it possible to absorb the investment costs of the BITD and ensure its economic viability. Moreover, the architects of the national defense ecosystem must not forget the export component: the goal is to maximize the chances of survival of the BITD and avoid repeating the failures of countries (such as Brazil) that had neglected this issue.
“The countries that manage to combine technological sovereignty, industrial agility, and international openness will be better positioned in the current geopolitical reconfiguration”
Securing the development of the BITD, for Adnane Kaab, requires the establishment of a collaborative architecture built around “the consolidation of an army–industry–university triptych. This is the key to creating a learning ecosystem, capable of absorbing feedback, anticipating needs, and producing at the pace of operational cycles.”
The goal today is therefore to consolidate the foundations of the BITD while taking into account an increasingly unstable geopolitical environment. An instability that, on the other hand, offers a window of opportunity for the kingdom in terms of defense. “The decade 2025–2035 will be decisive. The countries that manage to combine technological sovereignty, industrial agility, and international openness will be better positioned in the current geopolitical reconfiguration,” emphasizes Adnane Kaab, before specifying, “the question is no longer only what to produce, but how to organize an ecosystem capable of lasting, exporting, and transforming at the pace of future conflicts.”
It is therefore necessary to study and assimilate the lessons of recent high-intensity conflicts (Russia–Ukraine, Iran–Israel, Azerbaijan–Armenia), and replicate certain experiences under our skies. In order to develop the national BITD, but also to contribute to safeguarding the kingdom’s territory and strengthening its strategic autonomy.
Written in French by Amine Ater, edited in English by Eric Nielson
