The recent exchange of letters on the question of secularism between the Minister of Islamic Affairs, Ahmed Toufiq, and the Secretary General of the PJD, Abdelilah Benkirane, has revived a question: does secularism truly exist in Morocco, or is it merely an element of official rhetoric?
“We are secular. It is true that we do not have texts similar to those of 1905. But in our country, everyone is free in their choices. There is no compulsion in religion,” asserted Ahmed Toufiq
The former, recounting an excerpt from a private discussion with the French Minister of the Interior, Bruno Retailleau, to whom he reportedly replied, in response to a question about the Moroccan perception of secularism : “We are secular. It is true that we do not have texts similar to those of 1905. But in our country, everyone is free in their choices. There is no compulsion in religion.” That was enough to trigger a fiery reaction from the leader of the Justice and Development Party (PJD).
During a political rally in Berrehil, Abdelilah Benkirane castigated the remarks made by the Minister of Islamic Affairs. « Moroccans are Muslims deeply attached to their religion, and their country is a Muslim nation, not a secular state. Its king is not just any king; he holds the title of Commander of the Faithful, and that is nothing new, » he declared before an audience of party « brothers. »
The minister did not remain indifferent to this attack. In a lengthy letter, Ahmed Toufiq, who is normally known for his discretion, did not hesitate to reinforce his position, while regretting Abdelilah Benkirane’s obvious rashness in his judgment.
In this correspondence, the minister reminded him of the context surrounding his remarks: « You are the leader of a modern political party. And the modern political party draws inspiration from a secular Western system. » Responding to this thoroughly argued correspondence, which combines firmness and diplomacy, the Secretary General of the PJD, for his part, played the card of appeasement, insisting that the remarks made during the Berrehil rally were not directed at Ahmed Toufiq, but at those who seek to sow discord.
This correspondence quickly spread across the web, sparking interest and reactions from numerous public figures and internet users.
Keys to understanding the Toufiq-Benkirane exchange
In this exchange, two visions of Islam clash. As Asma Lamrabet, essayist and former member of the Rabita Mohammadia of Ulema, analyzes: « The first (Ahmed Toufiq, ed.) speaks from a historian’s perspective and a pragmatic political approach to managing religious matters, while drawing a distinction, and not a separation, between the political and the religious. Whereas the second (Abdelilah Benkirane, ed.) has a reductive ideologico-religious approach to the concept of secularism, perceived and understood as hostile to any dimension of religion. »
“Ahmed Toufiq’s arguments are not without merit, nor without humor, for that matter. But instead of secularism, I prefer to speak of secularization, which seems to me a more open concept”
University professor and author of Modernités arabes, Khalid Zekri, comments on the exchange: « It is always important to have a debate on questions that touch on the organization of societies. The mistake would be to try at all costs to mimic the French law of 1905. Despite the conformism of Ahmed Toufiq’s remarks, his arguments are not all without merit, nor without humor, for that matter. Instead of secularism, I prefer to speak of secularization, which seems to me a more open concept since it allows us to consider the possibility of a state religion while guaranteeing the autonomy of politics and civil society with respect to religious power. »
For his part, the professor of political science and specialist in the management of the religious sphere, Omar Iharchane, believes that « in terms of form, the debate is a healthy phenomenon and proof of societal dynamism that should be encouraged. For the opposite is nothing other than stagnation, fatal for any society. The jargon used in the debate is polite, and that is what we expect from two public figures who hold or have held an official position at the highest level of the State. »
However, the professor regrets that these exchanges did not establish the foundations for a public debate on the question of secularism. « In terms of content, the polemical character took precedence. Public opinion focused more on the unspoken implications, along with their share of settling of scores and ambiguous messages. The debate, therefore, stopped as soon as the messages were delivered, whereas if the objective of the two protagonists had been to establish a public debate, they would have expanded further on the subject, » observes Omar Iharchane.
The root: Secularity
Beyond whatever assessment one may have of the exchange between the two men, the question of the limits of religion in the face of secularism arises. This duality, far from being the result of a shift toward modernity embodied by the nation-state, finds its origins very early on, shortly after the emergence of Islam.
Mohammed Mouaqit, a professor at the Faculty of Legal, Economic, and Social Sciences of Hassan II University Aïn Chok in Casablanca, explains: « Very early in Islam, the Caliphate was transformed into Moulk during the time of Mu’awiya Ibn Abi Soufiane, who is considered the instigator of this transformation, even if some attribute it rather to Caliph Othman Ibn Affan. This shift means that we find ourselves in a situation where it is no longer religion that prevails, but rather politics that imposes its rules. »
Today, in the era of the nation-state, religion is only one of many sources of law. « From the moment we entered the institutionalized modern state, in order to have a monopoly on legislation, the state integrated Islamic law (Sharia) as a component to regulate certain aspects of societal life, »
“Concretely, in the Moroccan context, there are numerous manifestations of secularism, but in a way that does not contradict the religious foundation as a phenomenon”
An analysis shared by Omar Iharchane: « Concretely, in the Moroccan context, there are numerous manifestations of secularism, but in a way that does not contradict the religious foundation as a phenomenon. However, there are a few exceptions, and it is on these that some rely to claim that Morocco is a secular state. This conclusion stems from a confusion between modernity and secularism. »
He adds: »We can nevertheless affirm that Islamic law constitutes only one source of legislation among others. While it takes priority in certain texts, notably in the Family Code, it may lose that priority in other domains. Morocco differs here from Egypt, for example, whose Constitution, since President Anwar Sadat, states in Article 2 that ‘Islam is the religion of the State (…) and the principles of Islamic law are the principal source of legislation.’
What’s the place for religion in a secular system?
“The main source of confusion in discussions of this topic is falling into the trap of the French model. French secularism was constructed on the basis of conflict between church leaders and politicians”
The balance of power between religion and politics in Muslim countries, therefore, differs from one country to another. In Morocco, « this duality is first and foremost inscribed in our Constitution, which confirms a dual anchoring through, notably, two unifying constants (thawabit), namely, among others, the commitment to democratic choice and that of moderate Islam. Ambiguity or a genuine political will to reconcile these two frameworks? Be that as it may, this ideal of harmonization unfortunately remains difficult to conceive in social reality, » notes Asma Lamrabet.
She clarifies: »This duality, experienced as opposition, is essentially due to the predominant religious discourse and thought that reduces Islam to a dogmatic and orthodox vision, strictly legalistic and stripped of all its ethico-spiritual dimension, which is nevertheless essential and at the heart of Islam’s sacred text. »
So, how can religion and politics be reconciled in a way that guarantees both fundamental freedoms, individual liberties, and religious freedoms? According to our interlocutors, it all depends on the model of secularism we would like to have, independent of any mimicry or cultural subordination.
« The main source of confusion in discussions of this topic is falling into the trap of the French model. French secularism was constructed on the basis of conflict and contradiction between church leaders and politicians, which led to an absolute separation between private/religious affairs and public/political affairs. This experience is what created secularism, » points out Omar Iharchane.
“The Anglo-Saxon model of secularism, where King Charles III serves as Supreme Governor of the Church of England in his capacity as sovereign of the United Kingdom, could be relatively more compatible with the Moroccan context”
This model, entirely foreign to the Moroccan experience, cannot serve as an interpretive framework for the political and social dynamics capable of establishing a Moroccan model of secularism. Asma Lamrabet concurs: « In the Christian West, secularism was the product of a long historical process of liberation from the dogmatism of the clerical institution. This history has not taken place in Islam.
In Morocco, there is the distinctiveness of the Commandership of the Faithful, a model for managing religious and political affairs that has its own tradition and historical context, and which distinguishes itself as much from European secularism as from historical Arab secular ideology. However, the Anglo-Saxon model of secularism, where King Charles III serves as Supreme Governor of the Church of England in his capacity as sovereign of the United Kingdom, could be relatively more compatible with the Moroccan context.
The prominence of the religious sphere in Morocco’s public life is at odds with the establishment of a French-style model of secularism
The prominence of the religious sphere in Morocco’s public life is at odds with the establishment of a French-style model of secularism. However, Omar Iharchane does not rule out the possibility of drawing inspiration from models of secularism where religion is not completely absent from public life:
« The British, American, and German experiences have given rise to a completely different form of secularism, based on the possibility of coexistence between the religious and political spheres, provided there is a distinction between them and not an absolute separation. These experiences started from the premise that religion has a role in the public sphere and is not limited to the private sphere, and consequently, they have produced a distinction between the two domains, based on a set of determinants from which we can draw inspiration to build an authentic Moroccan experience. By authenticity, I mean here not a return to the past, but the avoidance of the trap of literal copying. »
An approach championed by Khalid Zekri: « We can draw lessons from certain experiences external to Islam to reflect on our reality, so that members of society can maintain bonds with one another without necessarily taking Islamic prescriptions as the sole reference for their actions. »
When it comes to interpersonal relations, the question arises whether, as Moroccans, we are prepared to separate the social and religious spheres
When it comes to relations between individuals, the question arises whether, as Moroccans, we are prepared to separate the social and religious spheres. Part of the answer lies in analyzing Moroccan social identities to determine whether or not they are permeable to difference.
Anthropologist Hassan Rachik distinguishes three levels for comparing social identities: « It is important to identify three levels for comparing social identities. Is identity univocal, exclusive, or plural; totalitarian or selective; innate or acquired? »
For the anthropologist, the plurality of social identity allows for greater individual emancipation: « Plural identity offers individuals the possibility of choosing among different identities, moving easily from one identity to another, or blending two identities, depending on the context. One can be, for example, Amazigh and Muslim, Egyptian and Coptic, and so on. But the problem we may encounter here is the hierarchization of identities, when the individual is compelled to choose a particular identity to the detriment of another. However, generally speaking, the plurality of social identity offers independence to the individual. »
He continues: "Totalitarian identity is one that leaves no room for any form of individual expression. This identity organizes every facet of a person's life, starting with their body, their way of dressing, and extending to their interactions with other members of their community. Selective identity, although it also presupposes certain behaviors, does not compel the individual to bear a single identity around the clock. One can, for example, listen to a certain genre of music and wear their jellaba to pray at the mosque on Friday. Selective identity offers greater identity comfort." Regarding the third level of comparison, the anthropologist explains that there are identities we inherit at birth and others we acquire: "At birth, one is assigned a name, an ethnic affiliation, a language, and sometimes a religion, and so on. But it sometimes happens that one chooses a direction different from the one in which the individual is expected to evolve. A person of Amazigh origin, for example, can become a fervent defender of Arab identity, or vice versa." These levels of analysis allow Hassan Rachik to conclude: "In certain situations, these identities can tip toward extremism or radicality to become murderous identities, regardless of the content of the social identity, which may be religious, ethnic, or otherwise. The first step toward this shift is the ideologization of social identities."
In the shadow of outdated laws
“For the past few years, we have practiced our religious rites in peace. The occasional intimidation we face comes from individuals affiliated with certain conservative political parties, or from media outlets aligned with these circles”
What about in practice? Adam Rabati, a man in his fifties, married and father of two, is also an evangelical pastor. He embraced Christianity in the 1980s. Regularly, he welcomes Moroccan converts to Christianity into his « house church. » »For the past few years, we have practiced our religious rites in peace and without any pressure, whether from authorities or citizens. No one obstructs our freedom of worship, » testifies our interlocutor, before continuing: « The occasional intimidation we face comes from individuals affiliated with certain conservative political parties, or from media outlets reputed to be aligned with these circles. Some news sites label us as obscurantist. »
Aside from these exceptions, everything seems to proceed naturally. Moreover, just a month ago, Adam and his wife, Farah, welcomed their second daughter, to whom they chose to give a Christian name. « We decided to name her Aster, and the authorities accepted this name without imposing any conditions, »Adam reveals.
However, from a legal and regulatory standpoint, certain difficulties remain that prevent Moroccan Christians from enjoying their full rights.
« There are still barriers standing against us as a religious minority in the country. For example, we do not have access to youth centers where we would like to organize public activities, and we cannot yet organize ourselves as an association, »
regrets Adam Rabati, who advocates for reform of the legal articles that limit the exercise of individual freedoms.
« There can be no democracy without guaranteeing freedom of conscience, » he continues.
“The principles of respect for freedoms of conscience, belief, and worship are inherent in the foundational text of Islam”
« Another key principle within secularism that is also present in Islam is that of freedom of religious conscience. Indeed, the principles of respect for freedoms of conscience, belief, and worship are inherent in the foundational text of Islam but have always been obscured by a rigid, theologico-political interpretation resistant to values of freedom and emancipation, »
She concludes decisively: »Unfortunately, Morocco did not enshrine this freedom of religious conscience in its most recent constitutional reform, where the focus was rather on freedom of worship. Yet the free exercise of worship is only one dimension, necessary certainly, but not sufficient for genuine freedom of choice and religious conviction. »
However, the question of the duality between democracy and freedom of worship should be framed in a way that lays the groundwork for constructive debate. Omar Iharchane proposes an interpretive framework: « Regarding what we are experiencing today, the proper classification is to determine who is for democracy and who is against it. This is the starting point if we wish to succeed in holding a public debate on secularism—a debate that could lead to a consensual formula on the nature of the State, society, and the system of governance in which everyone finds themselves and has their individual and public rights and freedoms guaranteed. »
Written in French by Amine Belghazi and Bouchra El Azhari, edited in English by Eric Nielson
