The Royal Navy’s determination, or necessity, to strengthen its capabilities has not gone unnoticed by the global shipbuilding industry. French, German, Spanish, and, more recently, South Korean firms are all competing for a foothold in the kingdom. Last January, TelQuel revealed how the South Korean defense industry intended to establish a foothold in Morocco, from the K2 main battle tank to the FA-50 light combat aircraft. The naval sector now represents the latest frontier for K-Defense: HD Hyundai Heavy Industries (HHI), the world’s largest shipbuilder, is bidding for the concession to operate the future Casablanca shipyard.
“The Moroccan Navy is interested in the offshore patrol vessel ( OPV), as this type of ship is optimized for its missions. It wants to build it at the Casablanca shipyard” Minhyo Park, Head of Naval Ship Marketing & Sales at the Korean group, told TelQuel during a visit to the company’s shipyard in Ulsan, southeastern South Korea. He said HD Hyundai had proposed to Morocco’s National Ports Agency (ANP) that construction of the vessel be incorporated into its shipyard project.
To strengthen its bid, the company has formed a three-way consortium with Moroccan construction firm Somagec and Turkish shipbuilder Kuzey Star Shipyard, which specializes in maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO).
One shipyard, two roles
Aware of the strategic importance of the project, HD Hyundai is positioning itself across both civilian and military sectors. The consortium is proposing a dual-purpose shipyard capable of building and maintaining both commercial vessels and warships. The proposal closely reflects the group’s own profile. On the civilian side, HD Hyundai is one of the world’s leading builders of container ships, LNG carriers, and oil tankers. On the military side, it has delivered five Aegis destroyers, around a dozen frigates, and nine submarines for the South Korean Navy, in addition to frigates and corvettes exported to the Philippines. This breadth of expertise is the company’s key selling point for Casablanca.
The Casablanca site, as set forth in the concession agreement, is currently “a blank slate ” as Minhyo Park describes it: “There are no workshops or infrastructure, only a synchrolift and a dry dock”. In fact, the project has been stalled for a decade: conceived in 2015, it was subject to an initial call for bids in 2019 for a 30-year concession, before Naval Group’s withdrawal in 2023 derailed the process. It was relaunched in April 2025, with an estimated total investment of 2.6 billion dirhams.
According to our information, the consortium’s proposal reflects this dual approach: a long-term development plan combining new shipbuilding and MRO activities for both civilian and military vessels, supported by a 30-year operating strategy that includes technology transfer and, ultimately, the creation of a national maritime industrial ecosystem. The concession covers the development, financing, operation, and maintenance of a site equipped with a 240-meter dry dock and a 9,700-ton ship lift.
An underwater component
On the military side, the proposal begins with offshore patrol vessels. But HD Hyundai is also introducing a far more strategic element. According to a well-informed source, the company hopes to “offer its submarines” to the Royal Navy, an offer that “could be integrated into the Casablanca shipyard project”. Winning the concession, the source said, “would pave the way for submarines”. Beyond OPVs, the site could eventually be developed to accommodate facilities dedicated to submarine construction or maintenance. According to this expert on South Korea’s naval industry, the approach is deliberate and tailored to the customer. “The Koreans are trying to understand the Royal Navy’s operational requirements in order to adapt their offer” the source said.
The support would go even further than for the patrol vessels. According to our source, the Korean builder would be willing to make concessions on submarines that would go beyond those envisaged for the OPVs and would, unusually, “cover not only technology but also intellectual property”. In the world of submarines, where ownership of designs and systems is the key barrier that established exporters almost never relinquish, this commitment is by no means insignificant.
Whether this is a negotiating tactic or a genuine intention, the proposal is broadly consistent with the approach presented during our visit to the Ulsan shipyard, where the company described its supply chain as “deliberately open”. Because much of a submarine’s value lies in its onboard systems, HHI works with European suppliers, including long-standing partners such as Germany’s Atlas Elektronik. Throughout the visit, Morocco was repeatedly invited to “participate” in this “vast project” alongside those suppliers. Some HD Hyundai executives made the message even more explicit during discussions: “Make sure your government understands our proposal, our submarine strategy.”
Officially, however, no submarine project is currently under discussion. No formal negotiations have begun, and the Royal Navy has not publicly expressed a requirement for submarines. Asked about reports suggesting Moroccan interest, Minhyo Park remained cautious. “They do have future plans regarding a submarine, but no discussions have taken place” he said. He added that, because submarines are highly specialized platforms, “it is time for the Moroccan Navy to determine what mission profile is required”. When officially questioned by TelQuel, HD Hyundai cited the confidentiality of the ongoing bidding process without denying the reports.
Morocco’s interest in submarines is not new. For years, the Royal Navy has been courted by France’s Naval Group with its Scorpène-class submarines and by Germany’s TKMS, although no contract has been signed. The Korean proposal enters an already established competition rather than redefining it. The concept of submarines being partially built or maintained in Morocco has already been advanced by European manufacturers. In this respect, as in the shipyard concession itself, South Korea is positioning itself as a challenger in an already crowded field, not as a pioneer.
Behind the manufacturer, a government initiative and an MOU
HHI’s bid is not solely a corporate initiative. In Seoul, Heeyoung Jung, director of the Defense Industry Trade Office at KODITS, a South Korean public agency operating under KOTRA, the country’s trade promotion agency, revealed previously unpublished information to TelQuel: Morocco and South Korea have been negotiating a memorandum of understanding on defense industry cooperation since 2025.
What would such an agreement mean in practice? KODITS points to the Malaysian example. The MOU signed with Kuala Lumpur in October 2025 established a joint intergovernmental commission that meets annually to oversee technology transfers, training, and industrial cooperation. The framework effectively transforms commercial ambitions into government-backed industrial programs.
Signs of this growing cooperation are already visible. Ahead of any formal agreement, KOTRA’s Casablanca office is handling an increasing number of Moroccan defense-related inquiries.
The Peruvian Precedent: A proof of concept
Human capital remains one of the central challenges. Morocco offers only a handful of naval architecture programs, while South Korea has around ten at the university level. To illustrate its approach, HHI points to Peru. Since 2024, the company has been building four surface vessels at the state-owned SIMA shipyard in Callao, with the first deliveries expected in 2026. Technology transfer there follows three stages: academic exchanges to establish the knowledge base, including the training of twelve SIMA technicians at the University of Ulsan, followed by engineering transfer and, finally, production transfer. The company presents this framework as adaptable rather than prescriptive, emphasizing that each partnership is tailored to the customer’s specific needs.
Asked whether a similar model could be applied in Morocco, Heeyoung Jung did not rule it out but stressed that it would depend on Morocco first defining its priorities. Once the MOU is signed, discussions are underway, and Rabat identifies the industrial sectors it wishes to develop, South Korea would be prepared to establish a partnership tailored to Morocco’s needs.
In principle, the answer is yes, but only once Morocco determines its own strategic objectives. Production transfer, however, is considerably more complex.“We have approximately 3,000 procedures covering every aspect of shipbuilding” Korean engineers pass on through hands-on training, line by line and procedure by procedure. As is often the case with industrial partnerships of this kind, technology transfer and mentoring depend on production itself: ships must actually be built for the know-how to be transmitted. HHI is therefore counting on initial public-sector support from Rabat. “The shipbuilding industry is very conservative. Without a track record of deliveries, no shipowner in the world will entrust their money to a shipyard” Minhyo Park said. As for the timeline to achieve industrial autonomy, the company points to its experience in Vietnam, where operations began in 1996. “More than ten years” Park said.
Peru also demonstrates how such partnerships can evolve over time. After launching construction of four surface vessels at SIMA in 2024, HHI signed a separate agreement with the Peruvian Navy to co-develop submarines, the company’s first submarine co-development project for an export customer. Based on the HDS-1500, a 1,500-ton design customized to the client’s requirements, the project follows a sequence that HHI could potentially envision for Casablanca: surface vessels first, submarines later.
The HDS-1500 itself offers insight into what a Moroccan proposal could eventually look like. Alongside the ocean-going submarines it builds for the South Korean Navy, HD Hyundai has developed an export-oriented product line, unveiled at the MADEX 2025 exhibition, targeting customers such as Morocco. In its Peruvian configuration, the HDS-1500 is relatively compact, requires a small crew, and features an open architecture capable of integrating each customer’s preferred combat systems. It is designed primarily for protecting long coastlines rather than conducting long-range oceanic deployments.
The Korean approach applied to Morocco
Establish a local industrial base first, then gradually expand capabilities. Within HD Hyundai, this strategy is known as the “Pan-Pacific Belt Vision” a model already implemented in Vietnam, the Philippines, and Peru. Morocco would represent its Atlantic extension, although the precise terms remain undefined. The strategy itself is well established. Its implementation in Casablanca, however, ultimately depends on a decision that has yet to be made.
HHI is far from the only bidder, and the outcome remains uncertain. Of the roughly dozen bids submitted following the April 2025 relaunch, three are reportedly still in contention. Alongside the Korean consortium are a consortium bringing together Spain’s Marina Meridional, Morocco’s Radi Holding, and China’s Ningbo Xinle Shipbuilding, as well as an Italian operator. In February, the Spanish-Chinese consortium publicly claimed that its proposal had been “ranked first financially”. Conversely, a Moroccan source familiar with the matter maintains that the HHI-led consortium is currently in a favorable position. Neither claim can be independently verified. The ANP, which has not commented publicly, remains the sole authority responsible for selecting the winning bidder.
What “transfer” really means
Ultimately, one question will determine the value of any such partnership for Morocco. Building hulls in Casablanca, assembling patrol vessels under license, and training Moroccan engineers would undoubtedly strengthen national capabilities, but only to a point. Dependence does not disappear; it merely changes form. Even HD Hyundai, the world’s largest shipbuilder, is not fully autonomous. The Aegis combat system installed on its destroyers is American, while some of its electronic systems come from Europe. The Korean giant promotes technology transfer while itself relying on foreign suppliers for some of its most sensitive technologies.
This is the central issue underlying agreements of this kind, and the principle that should guide any negotiations. An industrial partnership is only as valuable as the capabilities it genuinely transfers. Accepting a degree of limited operational sovereignty in exchange for acquiring industrial know-how is a legitimate strategic choice, and one adopted by many middle powers.
That choice, however, must be backed by clear guarantees. How much of the value chain will Morocco ultimately control? What access will it have to designs, source codes, maintenance rights, and export freedoms? Without such guarantees, Morocco risks financing little more than an assembly facility rather than laying the foundations of a genuine national shipbuilding industry. The ANP’s decision, expected in early August, will determine whether Casablanca becomes an assembly hub, or the first building block of Morocco’s future naval sovereignty.
Writen in French by Amina Ater, edited in English by Amina Kadiri
