TelQuel : You have examined the Finance Bill 2025. Is it in line with the fundamentals of a social state?
Najib Akesbi: There’s a fundamental problem that persists and has been growing since 2021. But first of all, let me give you a quick reading of the Finance Bill. The PLF 2025 highlights the fact that the healthcare budget continues to grow, that’s undeniable. The number of jobs created (6,500) is significant, and continues to rise compared with previous years. In fact, health is one of the three priority sectors for job creation, along with the two key sectors of the Interior and Defense.
What is also indisputable is that, for better or worse, the direct aid program is being rolled out. One gets the impression that what was originally planned is more or less being maintained: in 2021-2022, the medical coverage project; in 2023, family allowances converted into direct aid; in 2024, compensation for loss of employment; and finally, in 2025, pension reform.
For the moment, I’m only giving a cursory reading to say that, on paper, medical cover has been completed, as have benefits and direct aid. What remains, namely compensation for loss of employment and pension reform, we hope to see progress in 2025. So, on paper, of the four objectives, two have been achieved and two remain outstanding, with just over a year to go.
Now that we’ve said that, we still haven’t said the essential part. Because in detail, we’re still a long way from total, generalized medical coverage. And this for factual reasons.
Can you cite any specific cases where medical coverage has failed?
For example, to take just the simplest category to assess, and one which is normally covered automatically, that of salaried employees, statistics show that 55 to 60% of them have no contract. If we add those with precarious or time-limited contracts, we quickly exceed three quarters of all employees. This means that the employee population, which is the easiest to cover, does not necessarily benefit from coverage.
Another category dominates in terms of numbers, that of non-salaried workers (TNS, travailleurs non-salariés). This is the whole army of small trades: shopkeepers, craftsmen, plumbers, hairdressers and so on. They are far from benefiting from medical coverage. And this is CNSS’s biggest problem. Because of their precarious, unstable activity, TNSs can contribute one month if their monthly income allows, and stop contributing the next month if their income drops. And yet, to benefit from medical coverage, you need to be up to date with your contributions. This is where we see the vulnerability of a large part of the population: there is no mechanism for cushioning income fluctuations.
The same applies to the job loss indemnity. This benefit is supposed to temporarily compensate the person who no longer has a job until he or she finds a new one. At least in philosophy, it’s a form of insurance or guarantee for the worker. However, in return for the TNS contribution, there is no such mechanism. There is no equalization fund or system of this kind that can contribute for the worker for a time, obviously under certain conditions, in order to prevent coverage from being discontinued.
Let’s move on to actual coverage. Let me take the case of the ten or eleven million beneficiaries of AMO Tadamon. This system works well when it comes to major operations that require a high level of coverage. But in general, AMO Tadamon works in the classic way: the patient consults the doctor and pays for the consultation. The patient then receives a medical prescription, has to buy medicines, pay for tests and X-rays, and so on. All these expenses are incurred by the patient, who then awaits reimbursement.
The big novelty here is that the most vulnerable categories have access to private healthcare establishments. Isn’t that a good thing?
Here again, what our officials unfortunately don’t understand is that, by definition, if a person is under the AMO Tadamon scheme, it’s because the State recognizes that they don’t have the means to contribute. In practice, however, this person has to pay a consultation fee of 300 dirhams, plus another 500 or 1000 dirhams for drugs, X-rays, etc. In the end, the result is that three-quarters of them cannot benefit from AMO Tadamon because they have no money to pay in advance.
What’s more, in countries where this kind of coverage has been introduced, we’re seeing a phenomenon of migration from public hospitals to the private sector among the poorer and poorer sections of the population. Clearly, if people are assured of coverage, they prefer to go private.
« When the government trumpets the achievement of social coverage, it shows that it’s out of its depth! »
In our country, this is a phenomenon we haven’t seen… And it shows: public hospitals continue to be overcrowded. Mind you, this doesn’t mean that the private system isn’t benefiting from the situation, or that there isn’t a rush towards this sector. I would simply say that those who migrate the most from the public to the private sector are the middle or upper-middle classes, rather than the category benefiting from AMO Tadamon or TNS.
This brings me to the third level of analysis, which concerns reimbursement. Let’s suppose I’m a covered sick person, and I manage to find the means to pay the doctor and the drugs, I’ll only be reimbursed up to 30 or 40%, de facto, given the discrepancies between the prices charged by doctors and the national reference rate.
The same goes for drug prices, laboratory costs, etc. So, even if you’re covered and able to pay, the fact that you’re poorly reimbursed discourages the system. All this leads to a migration from the private to the public sector, because it’s the latter that’s within reach. That’s the reality today. When the government trumpets the achievement of social coverage, it shows that it’s out of its depth!
Medical coverage, even for duly registered categories, remains virtual and theoretical. Its feasibility is far from assured. After all, according to the assessments I’ve made, if we’re being a little generous, in terms of the number of beneficiaries, we’re only halfway to the target set by the government. Today, we can consider that around 18 million Moroccans are more or less covered. As for the rest, let’s not kid ourselves: we don’t have generalized coverage.
What is your assessment of the deployment of direct aid as another fundamental element of the social state?
The second pillar of the welfare state is direct assistance. I’d like to remind you that what we’ve been talking about for at least ten years – a real civilizational issue – is the « dignity income ». This is not charity, it’s at the very heart of the social contract: the same state that levies taxes has a responsibility towards a part of the population that cannot earn its income through work. The State guarantees them an income that enables them to live in dignity.
« What the government has done with the ‘dignity income’ is frankly shameful »
I would remind you of the RNI’s electoral program, which used the term « dignity income ». Personally, I was happy about it, I said to myself: « Well, there’s at least one party that’s using that term. Let’s hope it does something along those lines » (laughs). But what has been done with it is frankly shameful. It’s like a mountain giving birth to a mouse.
And above all, the system, in the way it defines who should or shouldn’t benefit from direct aid, is deeply flawed. I can understand that at a time when sophisticated tools such as the RSU or the national population register were not available, identifying the population in need of support was not obvious.
But now that we have these tools, we can see that there is clearly a problem with democracy and transparency. I’ve noticed it myself: every time a manager is asked about evaluation criteria, he or she is content to talk in generalities. But what people are really asking for are the criteria and their components. They want to know what the evaluation is based on. That’s what participatory democracy is all about. In the absence of any explanation from those in charge, we are forced to consider that it is technocrats, gathered in an office, who define criteria that are sometimes incredibly ridiculous.
In absolute terms, I don’t give myself the right to say that this project is good or bad. But what is obvious at the moment is that the problem with these criteria is that they have never been debated and discussed with the main stakeholders, i.e. representatives of the population, trade unions, civil society, etc. So, in the absence of transparency, democracy, democratic attitudes and behavior, we can pervert a fine idea. After all, it’s a project designed to satisfy a large part of the population. But in reality, the feeling of dissatisfaction is dominant.
However, we must be honest enough to recognize that this is no mean feat from a financial point of view. The program will cost 29 MMDH and rise crescendo to 40 MMDH. The effort is substantial. And therein lies the paradox: a major effort that produces so much dissatisfaction.
What about the sustainability of the direct aid program, given the size of the budget involved?
When you look closely at successful direct aid programs around the world, which have ensured their own sustainability first and foremost, you find that they have set up a dedicated, appropriate funding system that leaves no room for improvisation, unlike what we have in Morocco.
To date, we have nearly a hundred programs underway, financed by deductions from one budget or another, and we call this « rationalization ». This policy may work for one, two or three years, but it can’t work in the long term. It’s as if the government were saying « Après moi, le déluge! », preparing to throw the hot potato to the next government.
This is to say that the program won’t work until we put in place a real system which, essentially, defines clear, efficient and equitable sources of funding. And I stress equity, because it lies at the heart of the social state: the main aim being to reduce inequalities on the basis of solidarity. And the financing system must embody this solidarity and fairness.
We’re not going to reinvent the wheel – other countries have done it before us – by setting up an income tax system based on the taxation of capital income, rather than labor income, with a consequent progressivity, unlike what we want to do in Morocco. Incidentally, the 2025 Finance Bill envisages lowering the top rate, which was already inadequate, from 38% to 37%. We’re doing exactly the opposite of what we should be doing to be in phase with the logic of the system.
We also need to introduce a tax on large fortunes, an inheritance tax, and in general a consistent progressive approach, so that those with the means contribute for those without. Quite simply.
« As long as Morocco does not introduce a tax on large fortunes, (…) it will be exposed to the vicious circle of indebtedness »
As long as this system has not been put in place, we are condemned to trial and error, or else to expose ourselves to the danger of a vicious circle of indebtedness. And we see this in the State’s accounts every year, i.e. we reach the point where we borrow to repay. Of course, as long as this continues, and lenders continue to feed the State’s coffers so that it can pay the interest on the debt, the world’s monetary and financial institutions see no problem! At the same time, the country’s finances continue to sink… Until when? We don’t know. Now, the future of the welfare state is being called into question because the means are not there.
Let’s turn now to the high cost of living. Do you think the measures announced by the government will preserve consumers’ purchasing power?
Until very recently, the compensation fund played a role in supporting purchasing power. What are we talking about today? We’re talking about sugar, 45% of which goes to industries such as beverages and confectionery; and subsidized bread, for soft wheat, to the tune of 6 million quintals on the basis of overall consumption of 120 million. We’re not talking about significant proportions here. And finally, butane gas, which is the biggest item of expenditure and which is gradually being written off. So we can no longer consider the compensation fund to be a consistent mechanism for preserving purchasing power.
Now, let’s take a closer look at the measures taken by the government to preserve purchasing power. We’re talking here mainly about red meats, and more recently olive oil. The method adopted is ineffective, as it consists in giving money to the producer or importer, but without any conditions or specifications on the counterpart of the subsidy. And the results are visible.
For Eid Al Adha, the government gave a subsidy of 500 dirhams per head of sheep. Has anyone seen its impact on the price of sheep during Eid? Similarly, can we see today the impact of the various measures on the price of mutton?
So, the situation is as follows: if you give me money without asking for anything in return, how do you expect me to lower prices? If I’m an importer, all I have to do is match the market price. If the market offers me the price I’m asking for, regardless of the subsidy, then naturally I’ll take it. So even before talking about control, it’s the method used that’s inefficient, as well as being unfair. Needless to say, we’re at the heart of the kingdom of rents.
We saw an example of this last year, when the list bearing the names of importers was revealed… and it was because of an internal struggle between favored parties that this list had leaked. In the final analysis, it was a list of customers, including politicians, whom we wanted to interest in order to co-opt them for future elections.
« In reality, the government’s primary concern is not to safeguard consumer purchasing power »
So, the primary objective is not to stabilize prices or maintain consumer purchasing power. The objective is quite simply – if you’ll excuse the expression – to fatten up a minority of customers, of rentiers, who are there, watching, being in the wheels at different levels of decision-making… And it’s they themselves who steer. The same principle applies to the recent decision to lift customs duties on beef, sheep and red meat imports.
We know this too, because fortunately we have experience: one of the fundamentals of the market is, in this case, control. In every business, at some point in the chain, you have a powerful lobby imposing its conditions. In this case, it’s the wholesalers.
At best, you have a kind of oligopoly, in which there are strong presumptions of price fixing. And that’s what’s likely to happen with other product categories in the future. Do you think, for example, that the price of olive oil will return to the 45 dirham mark, as it was before?
If we take stock of all this, in reality, the government’s primary concern is not safeguarding consumer purchasing power. If that were the case, the government would be looking downstream, not just up the chain. It would have to control the market, ensure real competition, break up oligopolies and so on. These are all measures that could demonstrate that the government is interested in preserving purchasing power.
In conclusion, all these measures are ineffective because they have no impact on product prices. That’s not to say that there won’t be some optical effects, with a few momentary price cuts to calm spirits. But in the final analysis, these measures will have no significant or lasting effect. All they will do is reinforce class alliances that will become electoral lobbies to be mobilized at the next elections. That’s how the system works.
Written by Amine Belghazi. Edited in English by S.E.
